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Abstract—This article provides an extensive study of the 
current practice of online payment using credit and debit cards, 
and the intrinsic security challenges caused by the differences in 
how payment sites operate. We investigated the Alexa top-400 
online merchants’ payment sites, and realised that the current 
landscape facilitates a distributed guessing attack. This attack 
subverts the payment functionality from its intended purpose of 
validating card details, into helping the attackers to generate all 
security data fields required to make online transactions. We will 
show that this attack would not be practical if all payment sites 
performed the same security checks. As part of our responsible 
disclosure measure, we notified a selection of payment sites about 
our findings, and we report on their responses. We will discuss 
potential solutions to the problem and the practical difficulty to 
implement these, given the varying technical and business 
concerns of the involved parties. 
Keywords—security; online payment; distributed attack; 
fraudulent transactions; survey; ethical disclosure. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
ards are the de facto means of paying for online purchases. 
However, as the value of online sales has increased, so has 
the amount of online fraud. As an example, UK1 online 
sales in 2014 was worth £45 billion, which represents a 16% 
growth between 2013 and 2014 [1]. In the same time period, the 
value of online fraud in the UK has increased by 33% to £217 
million [1]. Online fraud is now the single largest category of 
card fraud in the UK, representing 45% of the total value of the 
fraud committed against UK credit and debit cards [2].  
In this article, we present the online payment landscape in 
detail. In particular, we aim to highlight the different manners in 
which online payment is performed, and the varying security 
measures put in place by online merchants – from checking only 
the card number and the expiry date, to fully-fledged centralised 
bank security mechanisms such as 3D Secure [3][4][5]. There is 
a number of questions we would like to address: does the 
difference cause a security problem? if it does, how common is 
the problem and can it be exploited? how much damage can be 
done? and how could it be resolved in the future? To determine 
the extent of the problem, we survey the ‘online payment 
landscape’, creating a mapping of various merchant payment 
implementations. 
                                                 
1 Sales and fraud statistics from regions other than the UK are less reliable but 
indicate the same pattern. 
We came to an important observation that the difference in 
security solutions of various websites introduces a practically 
exploitable vulnerability in the overall payment system. An 
attacker can exploit these differences to build a distributed 
guessing attack which generates usable card payment details 
(card number, expiry date, card verification value, and postal 
address) one field at a time. Each generated field can be used in 
succession to generate the next field by using a different 
merchant’s website. Moreover, if individual merchants were 
trying to improve their security by adding more payment fields 
to be verified on their site, they potentially inadvertently weaken 
the whole system by creating an opportunity to guess the value 
of another field, as explained later in the article. 
We demonstrate the practicability of exploiting the 
vulnerabilities with software that implements the distributed 
guessing attack.  We will show that the potential impact of these 
vulnerabilities is substantial because the card details generated 
by this distributed attack can be used to transfer money from a 
victim’s bank account to an anonymous recipient overseas using 
a financial services company such as the Western Union as a 
conduit. 
The vulnerabilities described in this article apply to cards 
that do not enforce centralised checks across transactions from 
different sites. Our experiments were conducted using Visa and 
MasterCard only. Whereas MasterCard’s centralised network 
detects the guessing attack after fewer than 10 attempts (even 
when those attempts were distributed across multiple websites), 
Visa’s payment ecosystem does not prevent the attack (see 
Section VI.D). Because Visa is the most popular payment 
network in the world, the discovered vulnerabilities greatly 
affect the entire global online payments system. 
We also carried out a responsible disclosure exercise with 
the payment sites affected by these vulnerabilities. Of the 342 
vulnerable websites, we presented our findings to the top-36 of 
these sites (in terms of the severity of the vulnerabilities and the 
size of their customer base), monitored their responses, and 
analysed the changes these websites have implemented to deal 
with our disclosure. Several websites, including some of the 
largest and most popular websites in the world, changed their 
approach to online payment processing after our disclosure, as 
we will report later in this article. To protect the affected sites, 
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we refrain from specifically revealing their names and their 
vulnerabilities.  
Finally, we discuss potential solutions to the problem. We 
will see that the vulnerabilities are systemic and cannot be 
protected against in isolation by any individual online merchant 
or by the issuing bank through improving their own security 
policies.  But first, let us look into how current online payment 
system operates. 
II. OVERVIEW OF THE ONLINE PAYMENT SYSTEM 
An online payment site uses a customer’s existing credit or 
debit card to transfer funds from the customer’s bank account 
into the merchant’s bank account. For this to happen, the 
customer needs to provide their card information during 
checkout. These pieces of information are then passed to the 
card issuing bank, who will process the information further 
before authorising or rejecting the payment request. This process 
involves a number of parties, each with different 
responsibilities. 
 
Fig. 1. Actions and parties in online payment. 
A. Online Payment Process and Parties Involved 
 Fig. 1 illustrates the actions and parties involved in 
processing online payments. The process involves the 
customer/cardholder entering their payment card details on the 
payment page of the online merchant’s website (action A in Fig. 
1).  The merchant controls which data fields are used to authorise 
the payment. 
The merchant then passes the card details to their chosen 
payment gateway, which provides a service of authorising and 
processing the merchant’s payment request (action B). The 
payment gateway, on behalf of the merchant, can also 
implement additional security filters at this point (further details 
can be found in Section VI.C). The payment gateway then 
connects the merchant to the card payment network to request 
payment from the customer’s bank account held at the card 
issuing bank. The payment networks (such as Visa and 
MasterCard) provide the link between payment gateways and 
the thousands of card issuing banks (actions C and D).  
The card-issuer holds the customer’s bank account and 
makes the approval of the payment (action E). The issuer 
maintains customer’s card record file, which contains 
information such as account balance, customer name, full 
address, and other card details not visible to the rest of the 
payment network. In the final step, called a settlement, the card-
issuing bank subsequently deposits the customer’s money to the 
merchant’s bank account (actions F, G and H).  
B. Payment Card Data Fields 
An online payment is a “card-not-present” credit or debit 
card transaction [6]. This implies the merchant cannot physically 
verify that the customer actually has the card. The security of 
online payment is therefore dependent upon the customer 
providing data that only the owner of the card could know.  
The payment card industry has developed a Payment Card 
Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS) [7], which provides 
a comprehensive set of rules and controls for the secure handling 
and storage of sensitive card data. However, there is no 
requirement for the merchant to request all of the data fields 
during an online payment authorisation, nor is there a mandatory 
requirement for the merchant to implement any of the optional 
security filters. Five pieces of information are typically used 
when making an online payment: 
 Cardholder Name: the account holder’s name as printed on 
the card. We found that no website checks that a name 
entered is correct. 
 16-digit Card Number: a unique identifier printed on the 
front of the card by the issuing bank.  Referred to as the 
Primary Account Number (PAN), it links the card to the 
customer’s bank account. 
 Card Expiry Date: printed or embossed on the front of the 
card. The expiry date and the PAN constitute the minimum 
set of card authentication data. 
 Card Verification Value (CVV2): a 3-digit number printed 
on the reverse side of the card. It is meant to be known only 
to the person possessing the card. It should not be stored 
electronically anywhere in the payment ecosystem [7]. 
 Cardholder Address: not visible on the card but sometimes 
used for payment authorisation purposes. Address 
verification is performed only on the numerical values of the 
street/house and postcode fields; any alphabetical characters 
are ignored. Different websites perform varying levels of 
verification on the address field’s numerical digits, ranging 
from verifying just the numerical digits in the postcode 
(partial match), to the complete numerical digits in postcode 
plus the door number (full match) [8]. 
III. DISTRIBUTED GUESSING ATTACK 
 To obtain card details, one can use a web merchant’s 
payment page to guess the data: the merchant’s reply to a 
transaction attempt will state whether the guess was correct or 
not. The reason this attack works in practice is due to two 
weaknesses, each not too severe on its own, but when used 
together present a serious risk to the global payment system. 
The first weakness is that in many settings, the current online 
payment system does not detect multiple invalid payment 
requests on the same card from different websites. Effectively, 
this implies that practically unlimited guesses can be made by 
distributing the guesses over many websites, even if individual 
websites limit the number of attempts. 
Secondly, the attack scales well because different web 
merchants provide different fields, and therefore allow the 
guessing attack to obtain the desired card information one field 
at a time. To understand how essential the scaling issue is, we 
look at the differences in websites in some more detail. The data 
fields that web merchants use can be divided into three 
categories: 
 2 fields: PAN + Expiry date (the absolute minimum) 
 3 fields: PAN + Expiry date + CVV2 
 4 fields: PAN + Expiry date + CVV2 + Address 
 Starting with a valid card number (PAN), to guess the expiry 
date an attacker can utilise several merchants’ websites that 
check only two fields: the card number and the expiry date. Once 
the expiry date is known, the attacker can use it along with the 
card number to guess the CVV2 information using another set 
of websites that check 3 fields (the card number, the expiry date, 
and the CVV2). 
Guessing an expiry date takes at most 60 attempts (banks 
typically issue cards that are valid for up to 60 months), and 
subsequently, guessing the 3-digit CVV2 takes fewer than 1,000 
attempts. Hence, expiry date and CVV2 are guaranteed to be 
obtained within 60 + 1,000 = 1,060 guesses. If all merchants 
would use three fields and ask for expiry date as well as CVV2, 
then it may take as many as 60 x 1,000 = 60,000 attempts. The 
difference between 1,060 and 60,000 is the difference between 
a quick and practical attack, and a tedious, close to impractical 
attack. 
 For many purposes, knowing the PAN, expiry date and 
CVV2 is sufficient to use a card online, but for some purchases, 
an attacker would also need to obtain address information. To 
guess address information, the attacker needs to use websites 
that ask for 4 fields. The address field is used in a variety of 
manners, based on the Address Verification System (AVS), 
which validates the billing address provided by the customer 
against the address information stored by the card-issuing bank 
[6][8][9]. The process of getting cardholder’s address for the 
countries that have a long postcode (more than 3 numerical 
digits) is not as straightforward as getting the expiry date or 
CVV2 because first, the attacker will need to narrow down the 
possible postcodes of the cardholder’s address. This can be done 
by querying the first six digits of a PAN through well-known 
online databases such as BinDb [10] and ExactBins [11], which 
will reveal the card’s brand, issuing bank name, and card type. 
Once the issuing bank is known, the attacker can increase the 
probability of guessing the right postcode by assuming that the 
victim is likely to be registered with one of the branches nearby 
– this is particularly relevant if the attacker uses NFC skimming 
to obtain the PAN and expiry date in the first place (see Section 
IV.B). Now, the attacker just needs to start brute force guesses 
from a list of issuing bank postcodes for a particular city where 
the card details have been skimmed from. 
IV. EXPERIMENTS 
We implemented a set of software tools to carry out the 
distributed guessing attack, using the research team’s own cards 
to verify that it is indeed possible and practical to obtain all the 
information of the card. Included are seven Visa cards with a 
spread of PAN, expiry date, and CVV2 values. We selected 400 
Alexa [12] top rated commercial websites for our investigation. 
These include many global websites such as iTunes, Google, 
PayPal, and Amazon.  
A. Software Tools 
The software tools implemented for the experiments consist 
of a website bot and automated scripts written in Java Selenium 
browser automation framework [13]. All the experiments were 
run on Mozilla Firefox web browser. Fig. 2 shows a screenshot 
of the website bot, which was used to automate the process of 
guessing relevant card information. The bot cycles through the 
possible values for each field to find the correct information.  
 
Fig. 2. Screenshot of the website bot, farming CVV2 from multiple sites. 
B. Obtaining Card Data 
The PAN is the starting point for the generation of all of the 
other card data fields. There are at least two known methods of 
obtaining valid PANs. Criminals sell bulk lists of card details 
online. These lists are considered less valuable when they do not 
contain the CVV2; nevertheless, such a list could be used as a 
source of PANs from which the expiry date, CVV2 and address 
information can be generated. Another method is by exploiting 
the contactless feature common in recently issued payment 
cards. NFC skimming [14] provides an attacker with the PAN, 
the expiry date and in some cases, the cardholder’s name. It is 
also possible to generate PAN using the first six digits of a PAN 
and the Luhn’s algorithm [15] and getting it verified. However, 
we did not take this approach because it is crossing the boundary 
of ethical research—we only used our own cards. 
Once the PAN is known, an attempt to obtain the expiry date 
can commence. We note that sometimes the expiry date can be 
obtained at the same time as the PAN, for example by using the 
NFC skimming method described above. But if that is not 
possible, the bot can be used to systematically guess the expiry 
date of a given PAN on the websites that do not require CVV2 
to be entered. The next step in card data generation involves 
getting the card’s CVV2. To find the correct CVV2, the bot will 
simply need to cycle through the possible values starting from 
001 until the payment website blocks further attempts. A 
handful of payment sites allowed unlimited attempts while most 
of the other payment sites allowed 5, 10 or even 50 attempts to 
enter a correct CVV2. In our scenario, we “farm out” the brute 
force guessing attack to tens or even hundreds of payment 
systems, which practically means we can carry out unlimited 
guesses. The final step generates the cardholder’s address. An 
attacker can exploit the different variants of address verification 
system (discussed in Section III) to find the full address of the 
cardholder.  
C. Transferring the Money 
Once either two, three, or four fields of the card data have 
been obtained, the attacker can use them to purchase goods on a 
website. This is damaging enough for the owner of the card, but 
we looked at even more impactful attacks. Rather than buying 
online goods from an e-commerce website, we created an attack 
scenario that uses the card details to open a money transfer 
account, sends the money to an anonymous recipient abroad, 
where the money is picked up within minutes of issuing the 
transfer.  The attacker needs to be able to clear the funds before 
the issuing bank reverses the payment and thwarts the attack. It 
is therefore desirable from the attacker’s point of view that the 
funds are transferred to an account outside the country (because 
it is more time consuming and costly to reverse payment across 
countries) or be conducted through a wire transfer to an 
anonymous cash recipient by using services such as the Western 
Union. 
In our experiment, the card information extracted using our 
bot was used to create a bogus account from which we 
transferred money to a recipient in India. Within minutes, we 
received a confirmation email for the order made, and our 
contact confirmed the pick-up of the money. The time it took 
from the process of creating an account to collecting the money 
at the destination was only 27 minutes, which is short enough to 
avoid the bank reversing the payment. 
D. Results 
Our results (detailed in Table I) show that the distributed 
guessing attack described in Section III is indeed practical and 
so a credible threat. We studied and tested the payment website 
of 389 of Alexa’s most visited sites (we looked at the Alexa top-
400 sites, but 11 of them did not reveal sufficient useful 
information for our experiment). As shown in Table I, 26 sites 
use only two fields for card payment and an attacker would use 
these sites to guess the expiry date. 291 sites use three fields, 
which one can use for guessing the CVV2, and 25 sites use four 
fields, which allows one to guess the postcode of the address. 
Finally, of the 389 sites, 47 merchants (i.e. 12%) had 
implemented 3D Secure payments (these sites are impervious to 
the distributed guessing attack, see Section VI.B). 
There is also a variation in the number of attempts allowed 
at each of these sites, ranging from 4, 5, 10, 20, 25, 50, or even 
unlimited. In Table I, the number of sites that allow certain 
number of guesses is shown in the rows, for each type of site (as 
represented in the columns). We see that most sites (276) allow 
between 6 and 10 attempts, but 6 sites set no limit to the number 
of attempts. There were two notable outliers to this observation 
in the top-10 highly popular websites, one of which allowed 
unlimited attempts to guess the CVV2, while the other required 
only the 16-digit card number plus the expiry date. 
Our experiments successfully obtained the valid expiry date 
for each of our Visa test cards, without exception. We also 
managed to find valid CVV2 information for our Visa test cards, 
again without exception. We performed more than 11,000 
CVV2 iterations using our bot and scripts, and our experiments 
confirmed that there is no centrally imposed limit on the number 
of CVV2 attempts when distributing guesses over multiple 
websites. The final step is to obtain the address information. Our 
tests performed more than 3,000 iterations on the group of 
websites that verify partial address (only postcode digits), to get 
numerical digits of the postcode. We extended our experiments 
and run instances of our bot on another set of payment sites 
(which verify the door number and the postcode digits) in order 
to get the full address of all our Visa test cards. 
TABLE I.  VARIATION IN PAYMENT SECURITY SETTINGS OF ONLINE 
PAYMENTS WEBSITES 
Number 
of 
attempts 
allowed 
Sites 
with 2 
fields 
(guess 
expiry 
date) 
Sites 
with 3 
fields 
(guess 
CVV2) 
Sites 
with 4 
fields 
(guess 
address 
postcode) 
Sites 
with 3D 
Secure 
(safe 
from 
attack) 
Total 
0 to 5 2 23 2 - 27 
6 to 10 20 238 18 - 276 
11 to 50 2 28 3 - 33 
Unlimited 2 2 2 - 6 
3D 
Secure  
- - - 47 47 
Total 26 291 25 47 389 
 
These experiments have also shown that it is possible to run 
multiple bots at the same time on hundreds of payment sites 
without triggering any alarms in the payment system. 
Combining that knowledge with the fact that an online payment 
request typically gets authorised within 2 seconds makes the 
attack viable and scalable in real time. As an illustration, with 
the website bot configured cleverly to run on 30 sites, an attacker 
can obtain the correct information within 4 seconds.  
V. RESPONSIBLE DISCLOSURE 
Two weeks after we completed the distributed guessing 
attack experiments, we initiated an ethical/responsible 
disclosure exercise, notifying Visa and a selection of affected 
sites. Based on the number of fields that a website checks, we 
categorised them into three groups: expiry date, CVV2 and 
postcode. Since the total number of vulnerable websites was 
very high, we selected the 12 biggest players from each 
category (in terms of the highest number of users), taking the 
total number of notified websites to 36.  
Once a suitable contact person or team for each website was 
found, we presented them with the disclosure information that 
featured the experiments we performed and the type of 
vulnerabilities on their site. We used our official work/university 
email address and this served as a means for these merchants to 
trace us back, so that they can verify our authenticity. This 
would also allow them to request more detailed and technical 
information about our experiments should they wish to find out 
more. 
We recorded the responses received from these websites 
over the duration of four weeks after we disclosed the 
vulnerabilities to them. Altogether, we received 20 human 
responses from 10 websites and 18 websites came back to us 
with machine generated response mostly confirming the receipt 
of our notification. All of the human responses requested more 
technical details while some asked us to suggest solutions. Out 
of the 36 websites we contacted, eight never responded. When a 
web merchant requested more information, we offered them an 
initial draft of this article, which explained the experiments and 
the attack to help them understand the actual problem. We 
followed the disclosure policy requested by the websites and 
anonymised the affected sites in our article.  
TABLE II.  NATURE OF PATCHING ON THE NOTIFIED WEBSITES 
  Patching Behaviour 
Web
site 
Informa
tion 
Leak 
Adding 
Addr. 
field 
Adding 
Delay 
filter 
Adding 
velocity 
filter 
(PAN 
based) 
Adding 
velocity 
filter (IP 
based) 
Adding 
CAPTC
HA 
A Exp. date √     
B Exp. date √     
C Exp. date  √    
D Exp. date  √    
E CVV2   √   
F CVV2    √  
G CVV2    √ √ 
H CVV2    √ √ 
 
As a result of our disclosure process, eight of the 36 websites 
changed their online security settings but the other 28 websites 
remained unchanged four weeks after the disclosure. We call 
such changes ‘patches’ in what follows, and Table II illustrates 
the nature of the patching of the notified websites. Of the eight 
websites that modified their approach (labelled A to H), four 
used two fields (labelled ‘Exp. Date’ in the ‘Information Leak’ 
column) and four used three fields (labelled ‘CVV2’).   
In most cases, we learned about the patching behaviour 
through manual observations, but in two cases (Website B and 
Website G), the affected websites notified us about the changes 
they made. Website A and Website B patched their checkout 
system by adding an address verification field. However, this 
was not a good idea because it did not provide additional 
security, but instead opened up a new avenue for guessing as 
will be discussed at the end of this section. 
Typically, an online payment request is authorised almost 
instantly (within 2 seconds). From our observation, we noticed 
that Website C and Website D (both with expiry date leak) had 
introduced additional delays to the payment authorisation 
processing times. They did it in a staggered manner: few 
attempts were processed instantly but after certain incorrect 
attempts had taken place, the time taken for payment 
confirmation were increased. In this manner, fewer attempts 
were available (at least practically speaking) to enter the right 
expiry date without setting a hard upper bound to the number of 
attempts.   
We found that Website E (one of the Alexa top-10 websites 
in terms of the number of visitors) patched their checkout system 
by adding PAN velocity filters, reducing the number of attempts 
allowed (based on the PAN) from unlimited to 100 attempts 
within 24 hours. Website F followed a similar approach and 
added IP-based velocity filter to limit the number of attempts to 
get CVV2 from 50 to 10 in 24 hours. Initially, Website G and 
Website H added CAPTCHA on their checkout page, thus 
disrupting our bot from carrying out the attack. Our experiment 
protocol limited the interaction with the administrators of 
notified websites. Due to complex trade-offs that payment 
websites need to consider when deciding which fields and filters 
to use, our ethical disclosure protocol did not volunteer advice 
about what actions to take to deal with the vulnerabilities. 
However, in one situation we felt we needed to depart from the 
protocol, namely in the case of Websites G and H, who added a 
CAPTCHA. CAPTCHAs prevent automated attempts in getting 
the sensitive card information but may adversely affect the 
usability of those websites [16]. To help Websites G and H to 
better understand the implications of adding a CAPTCHA, we 
provided these two websites with more detailed information 
about the attacks. This resulted in the CAPTCHA being replaced 
with IP address velocity filters, which allowed five attempts per 
IP address in 24 hours (hence a mark in two cells in Table II for 
these websites). 
 The overall result of our study on the nature of patching on 
the notified websites revealed that the vast majority (78%) did 
not make a change. We do not know the reason behind this and 
further research will be needed to find the explanation. Of the 
eight that patched, the general approach taken by merchants is 
either to add a filter to make it more cumbersome to try many 
times (6 of 8 sites that patched added delay or velocity filters), 
or to add a field (Website A and Website B). Perhaps 
surprisingly, none of the sites reacted by simply putting a hard 
limit on the number of allowed attempts. The effect of these 
patching behaviours is not so obvious. As we already pointed 
out, the sensible measure of limiting the number of attempts will 
not stop the guessing attack if it is not done on all websites. 
Furthermore, adding a card validation field may be a reasonable 
idea for a site for various reasons, but inadvertently may even 
weaken the protection against the guessing attack of the payment 
system as a whole. After all, the added field may be a welcome 
opportunity to attempt guesses on this added card detail.  
VI. THE CHALLENGES IN SOLVING THE PROBLEM 
Improving the security of the online payment system is a 
complicated challenge for a variety of reasons. One could argue 
that payment card security mechanisms are bound to remain 
unsatisfactory since they have not been designed for distributed 
operation over the distributed Internet. Many of the solutions, 
such as 3D Secure can be seen as afterthoughts, and they 
struggle to gain widespread adoption. Any suggested 
improvement or solution faces the challenge that the online 
landscape contains many players that all have their own – at 
times competing – incentives for or reasons against change. Any 
solution would have to combine technical concerns with 
financial and business operational concerns, and its adoption 
will depend on legal and economic dynamics. We explore and 
discuss these issues from the perspectives of the five parties 
shown in Fig. 1. 
A. Customer / Cardholder 
Since the distributed guessing attack described in this article 
uses merchant websites and card payment network to get all the 
card details, there is not much a cardholder can do to prevent it. 
At the same time, the cardholder is severely impacted by the 
attack: money may be lost, cards may have to be blocked, and 
the result is a waste of time and effort and a decreased sense of 
security. Arguably, it would be beneficial for cardholders if they 
could get organised as a group, or would have representatives in 
various bodies, to put pressure on the other stakeholders. As an 
individual, cardholders could ‘vote with their feet’ and select 
cards from card payment networks that are not exposed to the 
distributed guessing attack. At the moment, the payment system 
is too complex and non-transparent to expect customers to be 
able to make such choices.       
B. Online Merchant 
On their own, a merchant can do very little to prevent 
distributed guessing attacks. All merchants would have to agree 
or be forced to use the same number of fields so that the guessing 
attack cannot be staged as explained in Section III. 
At the same time, a merchant can avoid being exploited in 
the attack either by only using cards that use a payment network 
that is not vulnerable from the attack, or by using 3D Secure 
technologies recommended by the payment card industries [7], 
such as the American Express ‘SafeKey’ [3], ‘Verified by Visa’ 
[4] and MasterCard ‘SecureCode’ [5]. If 3D Secure is 
implemented, the card issuing bank is responsible for 
authenticating a cardholder before authorising the payment and 
it monitors the frequency of transactions and the total value of 
purchases for each card or bank account. The system will initiate 
additional security checks such as IP address and/or request an 
additional password if the frequency or value of the transactions 
appears to be unusual. Our experiments confirmed that 3D 
Secure payments are protected from the distributed guessing 
attack described in this article since the issuing bank has 
visibility of all transaction requests directed at a single card, 
even if those requests are distributed across many websites.  
From the perspective of the merchant, 3D Secure has several 
drawbacks, and these are reflected in that only 47 merchants in 
the Alexa top-400 have elected to implement 3D Secure. First, 
the proportion of the customers who do not complete the 
transaction can be high when the customer encounters the 3D 
Secure login screen: up to 43% in the United States and 55% in 
China [17]. Second, there are additional costs associated with 
implementing 3D Secure. 
We reiterate that from the whole payment system’s 
perspective, we would need a very high adoption rate of 3D 
Secure technology to prevent the distributed attack, because the 
attack would still work as long as there are sufficient vulnerable 
websites not using 3D Secure. 
C. Payment Gateway 
There are many payment gateways, which charge web 
merchants different rates depending on the number of fields and 
filters they ask to check and utilise. One cannot expect all of 
these gateways to be able to coordinate sufficiently to prevent 
the distributed guessing attack. Nevertheless, payment gateways 
can provide advanced features to their merchants, and these 
features should at least make it more difficult to exploit a 
website for the attack. Most importantly, gateways may use IP 
address velocity filters [6][8][9], which are implemented to 
detect repeated invalid attempts made within a certain time span 
from the same IP address. But with no coordination between 
different gateways, these velocity filters can easily be 
circumvented just by switching to a website that uses a different 
payment gateway.  
D. Card Payment Network 
Responsibility for authorising online payment requests 
ultimately resides with the bank which issued the credit / debit 
card.  However, our experiments have shown that distributed 
guessing attack described in the paper only works on Visa cards, 
independent of which bank issued the card.  When the attack is 
applied to a MasterCard, the distributed attack is detected.  This 
suggests that the payment networks have the capability to detect 
and prevent a distributed attack where the network is globally 
integrated [18]. 
The most obvious defence against the distributed guessing 
attack would be at the level of the card payment network. 
However, we are not in a position to know whether payment 
network providers could modify their network infrastructure to 
detect payment requests from multiple, globally spread payment 
gateways, looking for suspicious activities on a single card 
distributed across multiple merchant websites.  
E. Card Issuing Banks 
The bank comes into play at the final stage of the payment 
process, to approve the transfer of funds, but it would not be 
party to each individual guess (unless 3D Secure is used). Banks 
play an important role in limiting the damage that can be done if 
attackers get hold of card information. Many issuing banks are 
now running intelligent fraud detection systems which detect 
transactions which are outside their customer’s normal spending 
habits [6]. The issuing bank then has the option to block the 
payment, or ask the customer for confirmation, or accept the 
payment taking a calculated risk that a transaction may be found 
to be fraudulent later. A complicated set of considerations comes 
to the fore in the bank’s decisions, from ease of use to financial 
risks. However, one would expect that if they so desire, banks 
could have considerable influence on the payment gateways and 
card payment networks in protecting against the distributed 
guessing attack.  
VII. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we studied 400 of the most popular e-
commerce websites and surveyed their web payment interface, 
identifying that different websites present different sets of fields 
to identify the cardholder. It turns out that this disparity between 
different websites inadvertently creates conditions for a scalable 
distributed guessing attack. By conducting a guessing attack one 
field at the time – using a set of appropriate websites at each 
stage – the attack becomes practical. With the obtained data, the 
attacker can make purchases or transfer funds, as we have 
demonstrated.  
We showed that the attack works if the card payment 
network is not able to relate card activities from different 
websites.  Fundamentally, much of the problem with card 
payment stems from the fact that the identity of the payer needs 
to be established in the ‘card-not-present’ mode. This is 
inherently problematic since it is at odds with the original use of 
cards (where the card and cardholder are present at the moment 
of purchase). It also implies that, for instance, Chip-and-PIN is 
not available to establish the identity of the payer. This is 
exacerbated by the fact that the Internet facilitates distribution 
of guesses for data fields over many merchant sites. 
To prevent the attack, either standardisation or centralisation 
can be pursued (some card payment networks already provide 
this). Standardisation would imply that all merchants need to 
offer the same payment interface, that is, the same number of 
fields. Then the attack does not scale anymore. Centralisation 
can be achieved by payment gateways or card payment networks 
possessing a full view over all payment attempts associated with 
its network. Neither standardisation nor centralisation naturally 
fit the flexibility and freedom of choice one associates with the 
Internet or successful commercial activity, but they will provide 
the required protection. It is up to the various stakeholders to 
determine the case for and timing of such solutions. 
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